Despite numerous fits and starts at rapprochement, the countries have reconciled little in the nearly seven decades since independence from the British. Instead, they have moved in the opposite direction, strategically crafting national identities and policies along a singular concept: rivalry.
The British crown assumed direct control in over the subcontinent, and did more damage in ", when it partitioned India and decamped. At partition, "Indian princes were advised by the British to choose either India or Pakistan…and the rush to force them to join one or the other ignited several significant conflicts.
Since independence, however, India and Pakistan have sustained and deepened the rivalry to be just as culpable as the British. Today the two countries have three wars between them, a game of proxies inside Afghanistan, and a nuclear arms race, as well as a smattering of disputes over territory, water, and trade. Cohen thoroughly explains these problems and ironies, offering several explanations: a clash of civilizations, a competition between secular and Islamic states, territorial disputes, power politics, "psychological abnormalities," and the influence of outside powers.
Instead of favoring one explanation for the rivalry, Shooting for a Century opts for all of them, accurately conveying just how complicated India-Pakistan relations are. But the real strength of Shooting for a Century is its ability to detail the often-enigmatic psychology of the conflict in both Indian and Pakistani minds. By taking this approach, he invokes a historical sense of togetherness that is often neglected in the discussions of the conflict.
This Janus-like existence is proof that the legacies of colonialism and the trauma of partition still linger, not just in the form of anger, but also as sadness, fear, and regret. Indian political psychologist Ashis Nandy has eloquently described this paradox: "Pakistan is what India does not want to be… both a double and the final rejected self… the ultimate symbol of irrationality and fanaticism.
Shooting for a Century offers a thorough and balanced analysis of a discussion that is chaotic, confusing and overly biased. Yet the book offers no new ideas. Ironically, Cohen spends most of the book detailing the intractability of the conflict, claiming chances are high it will never be resolved, only to include a chapter on "Prospects. It is at this point that Shooting for a Century becomes repetitive, and the continued onslaught of reasons why India and Pakistan hate each other begin to fatigue the reader.
Cohen does acknowledge that a "qualified optimism is emerging on both sides and enthusiasm among Pakistanis , especially after the decision in to accept Indian trade terms. Trade normalization alone will not fix everything because, as Cohen points out, any prospect of major breakthroughs can easily "be blown apart" by serious miscalculations, faulty foreign interventions, or terrorism.
There are too many spoilers between India and Pakistan for one facet of their relationship to become an all-encompassing solution for peace.
Cohen mentions dialogues between former policymakers and civil society organizations, backchannel discussions between government officials, and foreign efforts to normalize, but concludes that none of them will work. Instead, he makes a prediction: trade openings will reduce tension, but a "hurting stalemate will continue. He offers a few other scenarios worse than this one, and in the end, none lend themselves to optimism.
He dismisses as insignificant the ongoing efforts to collaborate on energy, the environment, and accepting the status quo in Kashmir. While Cohen could have written a more succinct book with a sharper argument, his reasoning is right on the mark. During the Cold War, Pakistan accepted millions of dollars in U. The Americans and Soviets were able to use India and Pakistan in their cold war fight, while the Indians and Pakistanis used their external allies to strengthen conventional military capabilities against the other.
Cohen begins the book by blaming the British and ends it with blaming the Americans. In the final chapter on "American Interests and Policies," he writes, "the Obama administration failed to develop a South Asia policy that would have encompassed both India-Pakistan relations including Kashmir and the grinding war in Afghanistan.
Holbrooke, was persona non grata in India, where "Indian officials were so irritated with his mandate that they made it inconvenient for Holbrooke to visit New Delhi. But Holbrooke was keen on taking a regional approach — something that the Pakistanis themselves welcomed. Pakistan has always wanted the United States to serve as mediator in its conflict with India. The current dependence on China might pay for anti-Indianism for a few more years but is unlikely to help Pakistan overcome its fundamental contradictions.
In the end, Pakistan would still need a new basis for its nationalism that is based on reality rather than engineered narratives of history and aspiration. Currently, ideological reasons dictate that Pakistan remain implacably hostile to India, maintain an expensive military and support jihadi terrorist organizations. But the cost of these policies has debilitating effects like failing to invest in education that develops critical thinking, being less globally connected and losing the economic benefits of being a friendly destination for tourists or investors.
Nor can it expect its international alignments to constantly bail it out of domestic political and economic setbacks. Paranoids do not function well as global citizens and, considering the complexity of sectarian and theological arguments, Pakistan is likely to only descend further into intra-Islamic feuds.
Dealing with militarism and support for militancy, as well as their social, political and economic effects, requires amplification of Pakistani voices that question its national narrative and offer an alternative one. India needs free, fair, non-hyphenated and questioning journalism even more as it faces multiple crises.
But the news media is in a crisis of its own. There have been brutal layoffs and pay-cuts. The best of journalism is shrinking, yielding to crude prime-time spectacle. ThePrint has the finest young reporters, columnists and editors working for it. Sustaining journalism of this quality needs smart and thinking people like you to pay for it.
Whether you live in India or overseas, you can do it here. Support Our Journalism. The article is informative but having much flaws. Writer did not take notice of division of subcontinent that was accepted by colonial power which also supported by International Community. The much responsibility goes to Britain as well as to Congress and other Hindu leaders including Muslim League that did not have farsightedness. Neither Indian Hindu leaders nor Muslim leaders had work on two nation theory and division of subcontinent.
No Hindu and Muslim leaders had true perception of religion in their minds. Even the leaders did not have knowledge of historical background of sub continent where the vast population reached in subcontinent from Arabian peninsula including Levant region, Europe, Mesopotamia, Azerbaijan and Iran etc. There is much evidence of continuous inflow of people from this region to India since prehistoric period. The people who were reaching subcontinent were adopting the old convenient culture, but after dawn of Islam that having high standard of morality and justice did not absorb in that culture, but they retained their culture and standards.
The Muslims in subcontinent were living in India since one thousand fourteen hundred years. ET India Inc. ET Engage. ET Secure IT. Web Stories. Morning Brief Podcast. Economy Agriculture. Foreign Trade. Company Corporate Trends. Defence National International Industry. International UAE.
Saudi Arabia. US Elections World News. Sruthijith K K. Rate Story. Font Size Abc Small. Abc Medium. Abc Large. The first-time Indian visitor to Pakistan is more likely to be struck by our similarities than differences. The dusty plains of rural Punjab are the same on both sides, complete with crop burning. Lahore looks no different from any major north Indian city. The old city, with its maze of by-lanes, motorcyclists grazing your elbow and little children narrowly avoiding falling into drains, will instantly remind you of Lucknow or Chandni Chowk.
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